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POINT BLANK: PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
TAKES AIM AT GUNS
DEBORAH ROBINSON, J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
Life in our dot com world has become perilous: the pills we take
to cure one malady seem to cause problems elsewhere; automobile air
bags may break bones; in the cruelest betrayal of all, the lawyer's best
friend, the cell phone, now shows promise as a carcinogen. The tech-
nology we crave and in which we invest with abandon opens new vistas
but often leaves us with lingering suspicion: what will happen to our
eyes twenty years after our laser surgery?
As a culture, we are fascinated with things. To a large extent, the
modern law of product liability reflects that fascination. Product lia-
bility law has developed a set of rules by which to assess the value of
things to society and ultimately assign responsibility for the harm
caused by the objects.' Ironically, as this area of the law ostensibly
moves increasingly in the direction of imposing liability that is truly
"strict"-that is, liability without fault-the gun, much in the news,
often vilified, may well prove to be the most non-defective product
ever made.
There is no question that violence involving guns is an American
societal problem of epidemic proportion. Other papers in this issue
will plumb the depths of gun violence statistics. The purpose of this
paper is not to advocate for or argue against the existence of guns in
society, nor to advocate for or argue against more statutes and regula-
tions regarding guns. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate
that the law of products liability does not provide a sound basis for the
imposition of liability against manufacturers of well-made,2 non-defec-
tive guns.
* Partner, Robinson Woolson, P.A.; Adjunct Faculty, University of Maryland, School
of Law.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §2 (1998).
2. Excluded from this discussion are cases of obvious product defect, such as those in
which a gun misfires or malfunctions. In those instances "there may be recovery, in appro-
priate circumstances, under settled principles of products liability law." Kelley v. R.G. In-
dus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1143, n.2 (Md. 1985); see also, Scronce v. Howard Bros. Discount
Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1204, 1205 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff alleged rifle "exploded" at shoot-
ing range).
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I. LITIGATION AGAINST GUN MANUFACTURERS
Beginning in at least the 1980s, people who had been injured by
gunshots, and as often their survivors, filed civil lawsuits against gun
manufacturers3 seeking to hold them liable under various theories.
The typical context in which these suits have arisen either involves an
innocent person who has been shot during the commission of a
crime, or a child shot while exploring a gun found in the home or
during play with another child.4 These lawsuits have nearly univer-
sally ended in verdicts for the defendants. 5 Undaunted by their stun-
ning lack of success in the civil courts, would-be gun plaintiffs have
shifted theories of recovery in an attempt to find one that would stick
to the manufacturers. A review of these cases follows.
A number of early suits involving firearms alleged that gun and
ammunition manufacturers were liable in ordinary negligence merely
for making and selling their products. These plaintiffs postulated that
the manufacture and sale of firearms to the general public created an
unreasonable risk of harm, and that injury caused by these weapons
was thus legally compensable.6 Holding that manufacturers owe no
duty to refrain from making and selling non-defective, legally-made
3. Suits have also been initiated against manufacturers of ammunition. See, e.g., Mc-
Carthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd sub nom; McCar-
thy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir, 1997) (suit filed against manufacturer of hollow-
point "Black Talon" bullets used in shooting spree on passenger train).
4. See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986); Moore
v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250
(5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984);
Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370 (D. Mass. 1996); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F.
Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987), affd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Patterson v. Gesellschaft,
608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass.
1983); DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Bennet v. Cincin-
nati Checker Cab Co., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Ky. 1973); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 686
F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1986), affd, 900 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Trespalacios v. Valor
Corp., 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 325 S.E.2d 465
(Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Il1. App. Ct.
1985); Linton v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 469 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. App. 3d 1984); Addison v.
Williams, 546 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 1989); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53
(Mich. App. 1997); King v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. App. 1990); Robinson
v. Howard Bros. of Jackson, Inc., 372 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979); Richardson v. Holland, 741
S.W.2d 751 (Mo. App. 1987); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118 (Or. 1985);
Diggles v. Horwitz, 765 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1989); Robertson v. Grogan Inv.
Co., 710 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App. Dallas 1986); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748
P.2d 661 (Wash. App. 1988).
5. See supra note 4.
6. See Adkison v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1983); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc.,
656 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987); Knott v. LibertyJewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661 (Wash.
1988); First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. 1995); Forni
v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger and Co., 916
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products to the general public, the courts have easily dispensed with
these negligence actions.7
Plaintiffs in civil actions against gun manufacturers have alterna-
tively claimed that the manufacturers should be held strictly liable
under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, section 402A8 for the inju-
ries caused by their weapons. These plaintiffs have primarily asserted
design defect claims-that is, that even a properly-functioning gun
may subject its maker to liability if it fails to incorporate "enough
safety" into its design to have prevented the injury that occurred to
the plaintiff.9 A great debate then ensued over what theoretical "test"
of product defectiveness should be applied to guns. Two principal
tests of product defect have evolved in the law to assess whether a
product subjects its maker to strict liability: the consumer expectations
test and the risk-utility test.'
The consumer expectations test of strict liability, established in
section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, provides that a
product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, subjecting its maker
to liability, if the product is "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997);
Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1997).
7. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997); Shipman v. Jennings
Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771
(D.N.M. 1987); Adkison v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1983); First Commercial
Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1995); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564
A.2d 758 (D.D.C. 1989), affd, 900 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Trespalacios v. Valor Corp.,
486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1986); Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. 1985);
Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. 1984); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566
N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1997); Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Knott v.
Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661 (Wash. 1988).
8. Section 402A provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is ei gaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected
to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condi-
tion in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a)
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Main Vol. 1963-1964).
9. The primary focus of a design defect claim usually involves the absence of safety
locks, trigger locks, or other technology to reduce the possibility of an adult other than the
owner being able to fire the gun, and claims regarding the easy concealability of the
weapon, making it more likely to be used in the commission of a crime. See, e.g., Stephen
P. Teret & Garen J. Wintemute, Handgun Injuries: The Epidemiological Evidence for Assessing
Legal Responsibility, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 341, 347-48 (1983).
10. See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITv AND SAFETY 190 (3d ed. 1996).
[VoL. 4:88
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purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics."" The problems for plaintiffs inherent in this
test as applied to guns are obvious: the ordinary consumer who
purchases a gun expects it to shoot with deadly force, and if the gun
indeed shoots with deadly force, the consumer's expectations are not
frustrated; they are perfectly met.
Such an analysis was set forth with blinding logic by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc. 2 There, the court
reasoned:
[f]or a seller to be liable under section 402A, the product
must be both in a "defective condition" and "unreasonably
dangerous" at the time that it is placed on the market by the
seller. Both of these conditions are explained in the official
comments in terms of consumer expectations. As Comment
g explains, the requirement of a defective condition limits
application of section 402A to those situations where "the
product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condi-
tion not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him." An "unreasonably dan-
gerous product is defined in Comment i as one which is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
templated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."
A handgun manufacturer or marketer could not be held
liable under this theory. Contrary to [the plaintiffs] argu-
ment, a handgun is not defective merely because it is capable
of being used during criminal activity to inflict harm. A con-
sumer would expect a handgun to be dangerous, by its very
nature, and to have the capacity to fire a bullet with deadly
force. [The plaintiff] confuses a product's normal function,
which may very well be dangerous, with a defect in a prod-
uct's design or construction . . . . For the handgun to be
defective, there would have to be a problem in its manufac-
ture or design, such as a weak or improperly placed part, that
would cause it to fire unexpectedly or otherwise
malfunction. "
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt i. (Main Vol. 1963-1964). Comment
g to § 402A defines a defective condition as one "not contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."
12. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985). See also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
13. Id. at 1148 (quoting Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976) (em-
phasis in original)); see also Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99 (Ill.
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The consumer expectations test affording no relief to plaintiffs
seeking to hold gun manufacturers strictly liable, some plaintiffs then
turned to the risk-utility test, first articulated by a court in Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co., Inc. 4 There, the California Supreme Court estab-
lished that a product is defective in design "if the plaintiff proves that
the product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant
fails to prove ... that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design."5
Plaintiffs felt that the risk-utility test paved a clear road to victory
for them in litigation against gun manufacturers. Simply put, they felt
that the "utility" side of the balancing equation was virtually nil and
the "risk" side insurmountable.' 6 A leading proponent of this view,
Professor Stephen P. Teret of the Johns Hopkins University School of
Public Health, engaged in this analysis by identifying these elements
of "risk" inherent in guns:' 7 (a) for some segments of the population,
murder is the leading cause of death, and being shot by a handgun is
the most common form of murder; (b) thousands of cases of homi-
cide occur each year by use of handguns; (c) deaths by handgun oc-
cur disproportionately to the percentage of handguns that comprise
the universe of firearms; (d) the risk of death by gun is not confined
to any specific category of people; (e) the number of murders per
year has been increasing over time; (f) the prevalence of handguns in
the United States provides the risk of injury; (g) handguns are user-
friendly; (h) handguns are often not designed to prevent inadvertent
use or accidental injury; and (i) the concealability of the common
handgun contributes materially to its risk. 8 The only good thing Pro-
fessor Teret and his colleague had to say about handguns in the risk-
utility calculus was a passing reference to their "legitimate use," which
they derisively defined as self-protection, target practice, hunting, and
employment.' 9
1985); Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 200 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
14. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
15. Id. at 432.
16. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1251 (5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Har-
rington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984); Patterson v. Gesellschaft,
608 F. Supp. 1206, 1208 (N.D. Tex.1985); Richman v. Charter Arms Co., 571 F. Supp. 192,
202 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd on other grounds.
17. The author was discussing primarily handguns, as opposed to all forms of guns.
18. See Teret & Wintemute, supra note 9, at 345-48.
19. See id. at 348. Professor Teret went on to debunk the notion that a handgun pro-
vides its owner with protection. Id. Studies that cite the likelihood of a homeowner's be-
ing shot with his own gun as proof that a gun is more dangerous than protective do not
and cannot take into account the immeasurable possible deterrent effect a gun may have
[VOr. 4:88
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Yet despite the optimism with which plaintiffs approached the
courts with their risk-utility theories of gun manufacturers' liability,
the courts have universally rejected those claims. 2" The clearest ratio-
nale for this rejection can be found in the Maryland Court of Appeals'
decision in Kelley:
We believe ... that the risk/utility test is inapplicable to the
present situation. This standard is only applied when some-
thing goes wrong with a product. In Barker, an unbalanced
machine tipped over. In Back v. Wickes Corp., . . ., a motor
home exploded, and in Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co.,
.... a power press caught the plaintiff's hands. These prod-
ucts malfunctioned. On the other hand, in the case of a
handgun which injured a person in whose direction it was
fired, the product worked precisely as intended. Therefore,
the risk/utility test cannot be extended to impose liability on
the maker or marketer of a handgun which has not
malfunctioned.
In sum, regardless of the standard used to determine
whether a product is "defective" under section 402A, a hand-
gun which functions as intended and as expected is not "de-
fective" within the meaning of that section. This has been
the consistent conclusion in other jurisdictions which have
confronted the issue.21
Another theory of recovery attempted by plaintiffs in civil actions
against gun manufacturers has been that of the abnormally dangerous
or ultrahazardous activity under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
sections 519 and 520.22 Indeed, a reading of the Restatement's lan-
on home intrusion in the first place; one cannot measure whether any would-be felons
bypass a home which they believe may contain a gun because they fear being hurt during
commission of the crime.
20. See, e.g., Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1251; Martin, 743 F.2d at 1202 ; Patterson, 608 F. Supp.
at 1208; Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 202.
21. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143,1149 (Md. 1985) (citations omitted). The
Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelley then went on to condemn a category of firearms it
termed "Saturday Night Specials." See id. at 1152-60.
22. See Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (11 th Cir. 1986); Moore v.
R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th
Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Armijo
v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.M. 1987), affd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988);
Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Il. App. Ct. 1985); Addison v. Wil-
liams, 546 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751 (Mo.
App. 1987); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118 (Or. 1985); Diggles v. Horwitz,
765 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1989); Robertson v. Grogan Inv. Co., 710 S.W.2d 678
(Tex. App. Dallas 1986); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661 (Wash. App.
1988); McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997); Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1146 n.2.
See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 519 & 520 (Main Vol. 1963-1964).
94 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
guage might suggest that those sections are a viable means of recovery
for injuries sustained from guns.23 Whether an activity is "abnormally
dangerous" under the Second Restatement depends on its satisfying
the following six factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the per-
son, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is car-
ried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by
its dangerous attributes.24
No court that has considered the question, however, has found a
gun manufacturer liable under the theories of abnormally dangerous
or ultrahazardous activity.25 In Kelley, the Maryland Court of Appeals
held:
Maryland law would not permit liability to be imposed on a
handgun manufacturer or marketer under this theory. This
Court has refused to extend the abnormally dangerous activ-
ity doctrine to instances in which the alleged tortfeasor is not
an owner or occupier of land .... The thrust of the doctrine
is that the activity be abnormally dangerous in relation to the
area where it occurs .... The dangers inherent in the use of
a handgun in the commission of a crime, on the other hand,
bear no relation to any occupation or ownership of land.
Therefore, the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine does
not apply to the manufacture or marketing of handguns.26
Around the margins of these straightforward theories of product
liability-negligence, strict liability in tort, abnormally dangerous or
23. See John P. McNicholas & Matthew McNicholas, Ultrahazardous Products Liability:
Providing Victims of Well-Made Firearms Ammunition to Fire Back at Gun Manufacturers, 30 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1599 (1997); Andrew 0. Smith, The Manufacture and Distribution ofHandgunsAs
an Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 382-83, 386-87 (1987).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
25. See Smith, supra note 23, at 387-88 (stating that Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F.
Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), the only case to recognize the "abnormally dangerous activities"
theory against a handgun manufacturer or distributor, was overturned in the Fifth Circuit).
26. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1147; accord, Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir.
1985); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Riordan v.
Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, 704 P.2d 118
(Or. 1985).
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ultrahazardous activity-there have been a few claims leveled against
gun manufacturers that have met with some degree of success. These
theories have in common a turning away from the design or manufac-
turing processes of guns and a focus upon the manner in which the
guns are marketed or distributed to particular segments of society. In
Halberstam v. S. W Daniel, Inc.,2 7 the plaintiffs were able to avoid dis-
missal of, and to have a jury consider, their claims of negligent en-
trustment based upon their assertion that the manufacturers in
question had a duty to refrain from marketing their products to con-
sumers "likely to be involved in criminal activity."2 They argued that
firearms manufacturers owed a duty to the public to take precautions
against the intentional, criminal misuse of their products where their
own promotion and distribution of weapons contributed to the risk of
such misuse.29
The Halberstam case is interesting not only because of its unique
facts, the particular venality of the gun at issue, and the result, but also
because it was presided over by Judge Jack B. Weinstein, a leading
scholar and innovator in the field of product liability law.3 0 The case
involved a massacre of Hasidic Jewish children in New York with semi-
automatic guns manufactured by means of mail-order assembly kits.3"
Defendants Wayne and Sylvia Daniel were the owners of the company
that sold the weapons through mail- and telephone-order assembly
kits; they did not sell already-assembled weapons.3 2 The weapon at
issue in the case, a Cobray M-1 1/9, was described by the law enforce-
ment professionals who testified at trial as unsuitable for sporting,
hunting, or defense. Its primary use, according to an article about
the gun in Machine Gun News, was "cleaning out a phone booth or an
elevator."3 4 Testimony at trial revealed that the defendants requested
no information from their customers other than that relating to pay-
ment and delivery; the defendants apparently did not keep good
records of their sales.35 Both defendants testified at trial that they did
not care who purchased their weapons.36 The court permitted the
27. No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
28. Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing
Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 681, 684 (1998) (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 681, 685.
30. Id. at 684.
31. See id. at 686
32. See id.
33. See id. at 695.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
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plaintiffs' theory of negligent entrustment/negligent marketing to go
to the jury, marking the first time such a claim had gone that far in
court.3" After six hours of deliberations, the jury returned verdicts in
favor of the defendants.38
Another very celebrated case involving the marketing practices of
gun manufacturers is Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,39 a complex and confusing
action involving claims of negligent distribution of handguns to
juveniles and criminals.4' The essence of the plaintiffs' claims in Ham-
ilton was that manufacturers and distributors of handguns worked to-
gether to sell and distribute their products to an oversaturated
national handgun market and to circumvent the law's efforts to keep
those products out of the hands of children and criminals." t Fifteen
of the twenty-five manufacturers were found liable in some, but not
all, of the individual plaintiffs' claims that had been consolidated for
trial.42 In some plaintiffs' cases, none of the defendants found liable
for negligent marketing or distribution was held liable in the particu-
lar plaintiffs' cases.43 In its unprecedented opinion, the court upheld
the jury's verdicts, ruling that "[t] he precise duty... in this case is that
of handgun manufacturers to exercise reasonable care in marketing
and distributing their products so as to guard against the risk of its
[sic] criminal misuse."44
37. See id. at 697.
38. In response to the jury question, "Did the defendants' negligence cause [the plain-
tiffs'] death[s]?," the jury answered "no." Absent access to well-done jury research follow-
ing the verdict, it is impossible for an outsider to know exactly what the jurors were
thinking in rendering their verdict. One commentator has written that "the jury's verdict
was driven primarily by a sense that the defendants' marketing did not cause [the plain-
tiffs'] death or ... injuries. Severaljurors expressed a belief that had [the perpetrator] not
obtained a weapon made from the defendants' parts, he would easily have obtained an-
other and carried out the attack. A number ofjurors stated their belief that [the] attack,
not the Daniels' marketing, really caused the death of [the plaintiff]. That is, the defend-
ants' marketing was neither a but-for cause nor a substantial factor in bringing about the
plaintiffs' harm." Id. at 697-98.
39. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
40. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1314-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing
on summary judgment the two plaintiffs' claims of product liability and fraud but allowing
them to proceed on a negligent marketing theory).
41. See id. at 1330.
42. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). This case was
originally filed in 1996 as Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). It was
amended to include more plaintiffs after additional plaintiffs attempted to intervene in
April of 1996. The original plaintiffs in the 1996 action re-filed their claims in Virginia
and California because of conflict of laws and jurisdictional issues.
43. See id. at 811.
44. See id. at 824.
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Another nibble at the edge of what was once an unbroken line of
authority in favor of the manufacturers and sellers of guns is the case
of Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.4 5 There, the appellate court reversed the
trial court's entry of summary judgment for the manufacturer, hold-
ing that a gun maker that negligently marketed its product could be
liable for a criminal shooting using its weapon.46 In Navegar, plain-
tiffs, victims of a mass shooting involving a military-style TEC-9 assault
weapon, claimed that the manufacturer should have reasonably fore-
seen that its weapon would be used in criminal attacks and that the
manufacturer in fact directly marketed a weapon designed for crimi-
nal use.4 7 Particularly of interest to the court in Navegar was the man-
ufacturer's advertising that its weapon was "fingerprint resistant,"
significant to the court as an indicator that only a criminal would care
about leaving fingerprints on the gun.4" The Navegar opinion is lim-
ited in application and carefully crafted; the court took pains to make
clear that its ruling did not constitute a blanket condemnation of guns
or their manufacturers.4 9 The court reasoned:
It must be acknowledged that the risk of harm from the
criminal misuse of firearms is always present in a society such
as ours, in which the presence of firearms is fairly widespread
and many individuals possess the capacity to criminally mis-
use them. It follows that the manufacturer and distributor of
a legal and nondefective firearm may not be found negligent
merely because it manufactured and/or distributed the
weapon. This does not mean, however, that those who man-
ufacture, market and sell firearms have no duty to use due
care to minimize risks which exceed those necessarily
presented by such commercial activities, which can be ac-
complished without unreasonably depriving responsible citi-
zens of the right to purchase and use firearms .... [T]he
manner in which Navegar manufactured and marketed the
TEC-DC9 and made it available to the general public created
risks above and beyond those citizens may reasonably be ex-
pected to bear in a society in which firearms may legally be
acquired and used and are widely available. Appellants'
complaint can best be understood as presenting a theory of
negligence based on Navegar's breach of a duty to use due
45. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). On January 19, 2000, the Supreme Court
of California granted review in this case, but has yet to issue an opinion. See Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 991 P.2d 755 (2000) (No. S083466).
46. See id. at 189.
47. See id. at 162.
48. See id. at 163.
49. See id.
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care not to increase the risk beyond that inherent in the
presence of firearms in our society.50
The Navegar case is not far in theory from Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp.,5 ' in
which the Supreme Court of Florida held K-Mart negligent for selling
a rifle to an obviously intoxicated man, who then shot the plaintiff
with the rifle.
5 2
These later cases, in which liability has been imposed on manu-
facturers of well-made guns, are not truly product liability actions.
They make no claims of product failure and focus not upon the prod-
uct but instead on the alleged tortious action of the manufacturer in
doing something other than the straightforward making and selling of
a weapon.5 3 These cases do not honestly confront the central ques-
tion posed by guns in our society: how are we best able to address the
problem of violence involving guns? Admitting. both that there is a
need for guns in our world (for police and military protection, as the
clearest examples) and that our world has too much gun violence in
it, how can we stop the wrongful harms that guns cause? And, for
purposes of this paper, does products liability law provide an ade-
quate, honest, logical remedy for this problem?
II. THE NON-DEFECTIVENESS OF GUNS
The previous discussion demonstrates that when the courts have
been asked to judge the defectiveness of guns as products, they have
overwhelmingly responded that guns that do what they are supposed
to do are not defective, whetherjudged by negligence or strict liability
standards. Liability, when it has been imposed, has been assessed
based upon the conduct of manufacturers either in super-charging
the deadliness of weapons or in failing to take precautions to keep
weapons out of the hands of children and criminals.5" Still, one does
not have to strain to hear the drumbeat of those who continue to
entreat the courts to hold guns defective as products.5 5 Municipal
and even state actions against gun manufacturers continue wending
their way through the courts; although most of the cases are too re-
cently-filed to have yet been fully litigated, the few which have reached
50. Id. (emphasis in original).
51. 697 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1997).
52. See id. at 1208.
53. See generally Kitchen, 697 So. 2d at 1200; see also Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr.2d at 146.
54. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
55. See Frank Bruni, The 2000 Campaign: The Gun Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2000, at A8.
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dispositive motions have fairly consistently held for defendant
manufacturers.56
Every test for product defect, from ancient negligence theory to
the most recent formulation contained in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, rests upon a moral foundation which
presupposes that a product may not be defined as defective unless
there is something "wrong" with it. No less a scholar than Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes as early as 1894 posed the question of firearms manufac-
turers' liability:
[I]f notice so determined is the general ground [upon which
liability may rest], why is not a man who sells fire-arms an-
swerable for assaults committed with pistols bought of him,
56. New York is the first and so far only state to sue firearms manufacturers and whole-
salers alleging public nuisance. See New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., No. 3748324
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed June 26, 2000). As ofJune 20, 2000, 32 municipalities had filed 22 civil
actions against firearms manufacturers and others alleging public nuisance, negligence in
product distribution, and defectively designed products. 14 FIREARMs LIT. RPTR. 8 (spring/
summer 2000). The cases are: City of Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99vs0149217J
(Fulton County Ct. filed Feb. 4, 1999) (Atlanta); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,
No. 99-2590C (Suffolk County Super. Ct. filed Jun 3, 1999) (Boston); City of Bridgeport v.
Smith & Wesson, Inc., No. CV-99-1531988 (Conn. Super. Ct. filedJan. 27, 1999) (Defend-
ants' Motion to Dismiss granted Dec. 10, 1999) (Bridgeport); City of Camden v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., No. 451099 (Camden County Super. Ct. filedJune 21, 1999) (Camden City);
Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 99-2518 (D.N.J.
filed June 1, 1999) (Camden County); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-
CH15596 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1998) (Chicago); City of Cincinnati v. Ber-
etta U.S.A. Corp., No. A99-02369 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Hamilton County filed Apr. 28, 1999)
(Cincinnati); City of Cleveland v. Hi-Point Firearms, No. CV-99-381897 (Ohio Ct. C.P. filed
Apr. 8, 1999) (case removed to federal court) (Cleveland); Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No.
99912658-NZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1999) (Defendants' Motion for Sum-
maryJudgment granted as to negligence and denied as to public nuisance by order dated
May 16, 2000) (Detroit); District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 00-0000428
(D.C. Super. Ct. filedJan. 20, 2000) (District of Columbia); City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., No. 45D029908CT355 (Lake Super. Ct. filed Aug. 30, 1999) (Gary); People v. Arca-
dia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. BC210894 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. filed May 25, 1999) (City
of Los Angeles); People v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. BC214794 (Los Angeles
Super. Ct. filed Aug. 6, 1999) (County of Los Angeles); Miami-Dade County v. Arms Tech.,
Inc., No. 99-01941-CA-06 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 1999) (Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
granted Dec. 13, 1999) (Miami-Dade County); City of New Orleans v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., No. 98-18578 (Orleans Parish Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998) (New Orleans); New York
v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 2000CV3641 (E.D.N.Y. filedJune 20, 2000) (New York City);James
v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. ESX-L-6059-99 (Essex County Super. Ct. filed June 9,
1999) (Newark); People v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. 303753 (San Francisco
Super. Ct. filed May 25, 1999) (San Francisco); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
No. 00-1442 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila. County filed Apr. 11, 2000) (removed to federal court)
(Philadelphia); City of St. Louis v. Cernicek, No. CV-992-01209 (St. Louis Cir. Ct. filed Apr.
30, 1999) (St. Louis); McNamara v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99912662-NZ (Wayne County
Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1999) (Wayne County); Sills v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99C09283
(New Castle County Super. Ct. filed Sept. 29, 1999) (Wilmington).
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since he must be taken to know the probability that, sooner
or later, some one will buy a pistol of him for some unlawful
end?... The principle seems to be pretty well established, in
this country at least, that every one has a right to rely upon
his fellow-men acting lawfully. . .. "
Thus, Holmes rejected the notion of gun sellers' liability because of
the intervening criminal act of another; the "wrong" that he saw was
that of the assailant, not the gun dealer.58
Holmes's concept of personal freedom resonates among legal
scholars today. Where freedom (e.g., to manufacture goods, to choose
what goods to purchase) clashes with injury to the person, the law of
products liability intervenes.59 The moral and ethical foundations of
products liability law require that a manufacturer be held responsible
for harm caused by its product only if there is in fact something
"wrong" with it; as Professor David Owen states: "A manufacturer's lia-
bility must rest . .. on something that is wrongful in its actions."60
As a nation, we do not yet appear ready to condemn the making
of firearms.61 What then is wrongful about the actions of a gun manu-
facturer such that the manufacturer may be held liable in a court of
law when one of its guns inflicts wrongful harm on an innocent? Pro-
57. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 1894 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10
(1894).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 4; see also David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law:
Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 430 (1993) [hereinafter Moral
Foundations].
60. Moral Foundations, supra note 59, at 462; see also,WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS at 659 (4th ed. 1971) ("There must, however, be something wrong with
the product which makes it unreasonably dangerous to those who come in contact with
it.").
61. At least. one state court has been prepared to condemn a category of firearms it
termed "Saturday Night Specials." In Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, while refusing to hold manufacturers liable for negligence,
strict liability, or abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity in general, did find that
on balance, a "Saturday Night Special" has so little utility, and carries such a tremendous
societal risk, that a manufacturer could be civilly liable for personal injuries caused by such
a weapon. Plaintiff's lawyer at oral argument to the Court of Appeals analogized the ac-
tions of gun manufacturers to those of the I.G. Farben Company, the notorious makers of
Xyclon B poisonous gas used for extermination in Nazi death camps. See Howard L. Siegel,
Winning Without Precedent: Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 14 LITIGATION 32, 34 (Summer 1988).
The court was unable to define precisely what it meant by a "Saturday Night Special," but
stated that they "are generally characterized by short barrels, light weight, easy con-
cealability, low cost, use of cheap quality materials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy and un-
reliability." Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1153. The court's opinion in Kelley was overturned by the
Maryland General Assembly by statute now codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 3A, § 36-I (h)
(1988 Supp.). The statute eliminates civil liability for gun manufacturers when a weapon
they made is used in the commission of a crime. Id.
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fessor Owen suggests that the constructs of truth and expectations illu-
minate the ideal of freedom and point the way to the answer to this
question: "Truth and expectations, rooted deeply in autonomy, ...
play a major role in determining moral accountability for product ac-
cidents."62 Manufacturers' and users' visions of the world are relevant
to the question of moral responsibility for harms caused by prod-
ucts.63 Thus, it is relevant to determine what both gun makers and
gun users expect out of a weapon; for the purposes of determining
whether manufacturers ought to be assigned liability, we are con-
cerned almost exclusively with the users' expectations.64
A recent Maryland case illustrates the relevance of users' expecta-
tions with respect to the question of liability of gun manufacturers. In
Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc.,65 plaintiff, surviving mother of a
child shot while exploring his father's gun stored in the home, sued
gun manufacturers alleging defective design and failure to warn.6 6 Af-
ter a period of discovery, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint,
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.6 7 At the hearing on de-
fendants' motion, the court posed the following questions:
Doesn't everybody know guns are dangerous? Doesn't every-
body know that guns kill people? That [is] true because we
have people who pick up the paper and see a child dead, a
child or adult, because they are doing something with a gun.
To phrase it in another way, don't people know guns are
dangerous even in the absence of a warning?
[T]his is a handgun we're talking about where there is a
question of whether any warning whatsoever is necessary be-
cause guns are made to kill people. That simple. Particu-
larly a handgun such as this was not made for hunting. It was
made to kill people, pure and simple.
[W] e're talking about a gun. And a gun, where clearly
the person who purchased it knew it was dangerous by the
way it was handled... [T] he risk utility test is applicable and
only applied when something goes wrong with a product.
And I think what they're talking about is not something go-
ing wrong in the sense of clearly Plaintiff was right, some-
thing went wrong in the sense that a three year old was killed
62. Moral Foundations, supra note 59, at 462.
63. Id. at 463.
64. See id.
65. See Case No. 24-C-99-003188 (in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City). This case is
presently on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. See Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,
Case No. 2095 (Ct. of Spec. App. Sept. Term 1999).
66. See id.
67. See id.
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and that's very wrong, but not in the sense of the gun behav-
ing the way one would predict the gun should behave, and in
the sense the gun operated the way it should have. 6"
Thus the court in Halliday granted the defendants' motions based
in large part on its view that the dangerousness of guns is well-known
in society.69 Indeed, one may go further and state without fear of con-
tradiction that guns are made in the first place for the purpose of
shooting, and some guns are made exclusively and especially for the
purpose of shooting people. These are precisely the uses for which a
consumer purchases a gun, particularly a handgun.
Similar logic can be found in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Perkins
v. FLE. Corp.,7" in which plaintiffs particularly complained about the
size and concealability of the handguns which had caused the injuries
there.7 ' The court reasoned:
The plaintiffs insisted ... that the small size of the hand-
guns at issue in these cases, which allows them to be readily
concealed as weapons by members of the general public to
whom they are marketed, is the feature that should be sub-
jected to a risk/utility analysis to decide whether the hand-
guns should be labeled "defective" or "unreasonably
dangerous." But the small size of the handgun, rather than
being something wrong in the design, even when the gun is
marketed indiscriminately to the public, is more properly
characterized as a central attribute of the design. At bottom,
then, what the plaintiffs seek is a ruling that it is sufficient to
hold a manufacturer strictly liable if the design of the prod-
uct causes injury, rather than a defect in the product ...
Under the plaintiffs' view of the risk/utility test, any prod-
uct, whether or not it has something wrong with it that allows
it to malfunction or cause unintended results, can be sub-
jected to a general balancing test by ajury of the risk of harm
resulting when the product is used in a foreseeable man-
ner-either correctly, negligently, or criminally-against the
benefits of the product.
No court in this jurisdiction has ever applied a general
risk/utility analysis to a well-made product that functioned
precisely as it was designed to do. The plaintiffs have not
68. Transcript of hearing and ruling from the bench, Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger, No. 24-
C-99-003188 at 35, 11.4-10; 57, 11.9-14, and 60, 11.4-17 (Cir. Ct. Oct.13, 1999), cert. denied, 357
Md. 482 (Feb. 10, 2000) (No. 555).
69. See id.
70. 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
71. See id. at 1272-75.
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alleged that the handguns in these cases had something
wrong with them-such as a safety mechanism that fails
under certain circumstances, a tendency to misfire, or a trig-
ger structure that can get caught on foreign objects and
cause the gun to discharge unexpectedly-that would bring
the risk/utility analysis ... into play .... We therefore con-
clude that as a matter of law the plaintiffs cannot recover7 2
What one reasonably expects a product to do has been an ele-
ment of the calculus of its dangerousness since at least the Second
Restatement.7" Comment i explicates the meaning of "unreasonably
dangerous" in terms of the community's common knowledge about a
product:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but
bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fuel oil, is
unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be
harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana
may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unrea-
sonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it de-
posits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks;
but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is un-
reasonably dangerous.74
The Second Restatement's definition of "unreasonable danger,"
then, expresses more concretely the moral and ethical relationships
among truth, expectations, and freedom in the assessment of respon-
sibility for product accidents. Stated more simply, given that society
knows that guns are dangerous, and that, to a degree, society pro-
motes and fosters that dangerousness, we cannot as a society fault a
manufacturer for making a product that gives us what we want: "If the
information is obvious or possessed already by consumers-that
72. Id.
73. "If ever a Restatement reformulation of the law were accepted uncritically as divine,
surely it is section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts." David G. Owen, Defectiveness
Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743, 744 (1996)
[hereinafter Exploding]. See also remarks of Professor Aaron Twerski, co-reporter for the
Third Restatement, observing that section "402A has achieved the status of sacred scrip-
ture." Id. at 788 n.4.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (Main Vol. 1963-1964).
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knives can cut and matches burn-there generally is no reason in
moral theory for a manufacturer to warn consumers. 75
The Third Restatement of Torts (Products Liability) casts off the
Second Restatement's now-classic definitions of "defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous" products and divides the analysis of defect into
three parts: those caused during manufacturing, design, and instruc-
tions and warnings. 76 All liability for products under the Third Re-
statement is premised upon the notion of "defect."7 7 With respect to
manufacturing defects, in terms that could be no clearer, the Third
Restatement imposes strict liability if the product departs from its in-
tended design, even if and when a seller exercises all possible care
with respect to the product. 71 In a typical civil action brought against
gun manufacturers, the manufacturing defect section of the Third Re-
statement is largely irrelevant since those actions do not concern
wrongly-manufactured firearms.
With respect to design and warnings cases, in contrast to manu-
facturing cases, the Third Restatement employs a "reasonableness-bal-
ancing-negligence" 79 test of defect cloaked in the language of strict
liability. In the Third Restatement, consumer expectations were given
the academic heave-ho as a defining test of defectiveness ° but the
obviousness of a product's danger continues to be a factor in assessing
design.81 Both consumer expectations and the obviousness of a prod-
uct's dangers may be considered under the Third Restatement as fac-
tors impinging upon the question of product defect.8 2 Both defective
design and defective instructions and warnings questions turn on the
75. Moral Foundations, supra note 59, at 465. See also, Note, Handguns and Products Liabil-
ity, 1997 HARv. L. REv. 1912, 1915-16 (1984).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (Main Vol. 1997).
77. Sections 1 and 2 of the Third Restatement establish the basic liability standard:
§ 1 Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective
Products
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who
sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the defect.
§ 2 Categories of Product Defect
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manu-
facturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate in-
structions or warnings.
Id. §§ 1, 2.
78. See id. § 2(a).
79. Exploding, supra note 73, at 750.
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a, e, and g (Main
Vol. 1997).
81. See id. at cmt. j.
82. See Exploding, supra note 73, at 779:
104 [VOL. 4:88
2001] PoiNT BLANK: PRODUCT LABILrrY LAw TAKES AIM AT GUNS 105
concept of "not reasonably safe" and return the black-letter law of the
new Restatement to the practice of importing negligence concepts
into the products field.8 3
Thus, under the Third Restatement, a manufacturer's liability for
a well-made gun turns upon time-honored questions of reasonable-
ness, consumer expectations, obviousness of danger, and all those
questions posed with such clear frustration from the bench in the Hal-
liday case in Baltimore City. 4 Specifically with respect to the matter of
guns, the drafters of the Third Restatement spoke as follows:
Common and widely distributed products such as alcoholic
beverages, firearms, and above-ground swimming pools may
be found to be defective only upon proof of the requisite
conditions in Subsection (a), (b), or (c). If such products
are defectively manufactured or sold without reasonable
warnings as to their danger when such warnings are appro-
priate, or if reasonable alternative designs could have been
adopted, then liability under Sections 1 and 2 may attach.
Absent proof of defect under those sections, however, courts
have not imposed liability for categories of products that are
generally available and widely used and consumed, even if
they pose substantial risks of harm. Instead, courts generally
have concluded that legislatures and administrative agencies
can, more appropriately than courts, consider the desirabil-
ity of commercial distribution of some categories of widely
used and consumed, but nevertheless dangerous, products.8 5
The new Restatement thus brings full circle the plain and com-
mon sense approaches with which we began evaluating liability for
The comments [to the Third Restatement] officially declare that the obviousness
of a product's dangers in design is only one among the many factors (if some-
times an important one) to be considered in the calculus of design defectiveness.
In warnings cases, on the other hand, the obviousness of a product danger often
properly continues to play a decisive no-duty role, as many courts have held. If a
danger is truly obvious, then its very obviousness informs potential victims of the
danger, so that the informational goals of warnings have been fulfilled. In such
cases, there is no value in providing warnings of dangers that should be known
already, and the (nonmonetary) costs may be substantial. The Third Restatement
adopts this view, which makes good sense.
Id. (citations omitted).
83. See id. at 750 ("[T]he new Restatement, like most courts in fact (but not in word),
explains liability for design and warnings defects in the reasonableness-balancing-negli-
gence terms of the law of tort.").
84. See transcript of hearing and ruling from the bench, Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co., Case No. 24-C-99-003188 (Ct. of Spec. App. Sept. Term 1999).
85. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. d (Main Vol. 1997)
(emphasis added).
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product accidents when Mr. MacPherson drove his Buick into the
ditch86 and the first dead mouse was found in the bottom of the Coke
bottle.8 7 Those questions ask what we expect a product to do, how
well we as a community understand what the product does, and why
we should hold responsible a manufacturer who gives us exactly what
we've asked for.88 The reason we squirm when we answer these ques-
tions with respect to firearms in particular stems from the unusual
nature of the gun as a product, for it is difficult to think of any other
product which is made for the express purpose of causing physical
harm to someone else. Because the law of product liability looks to
the expectations of the consumer or purchaser (the shooter), not the
expectations of the person ultimately affected by the gun (the victim),
traditional approaches to liability for this product may be seen as un-
satisfactory. When Ms. Halliday's husband purchased his gun, his ex-
pectations may have been perfectly met, and the gun discharged as it
was designed and intended to do; but the interests of the young child
who was shot by the gun are left largely unprotected by these legal
constructs.
8 9
The emotional content of accidental child shootings is closely
matched with that of drunk driving homicides. Interestingly, how-
ever, the public's reaction and the heated assignment of blame di-
verge in the two cases. When a person gets drunk and takes the wheel
of a car, then drives drunk and kills someone, the alarm is sounded
against the drunk driver-not against the car manufacturer for mak-
ing a car that someone could drive irresponsibly, causing death, and
not against the brewery or distillery that made the stuff the driver
86. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
87. See Crigger v. Coca-Cola, 179 S.W. 155 (Tenn. 1915).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (Main Vol. 1997).
89. At least arguably, the child in the Halliday case could have a cause of action against
his parent or parents for their negligence in storing the gun. It is doubtful such actions
are brought regularly, except in the most irretrievably fractured families. Another issue, at
least in Maryland, is the criminal liability of one who permits a minor to have access to a
gun. Under Maryland law, leaving a gun out so that a minor gains access to it is a criminal
misdemeanor. See MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, § 36K (b) (1992). The criminal code, however,
provides that its violation may not be considered evidence of negligence or contributory
negligence, nor may a party, witness, or counsel make reference to a violation of the statute
"during the trial of a civil action that involves property damage, personal injury, or death."
§ 36K (d). The court in the Halliday case, infra, viewed the criminality of the deceased
child's father's having left the gun in a position in which the child gained access to it as an
important fact in holding for the defendant manufacturers. See Transcript of Hearing, Hal-
liday, Case No. 24-C-99-003188 (in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City) (Oct. 13, 1999)
(Opinion of Cannon, J.) at 60, 11. 18-22: "1 think also, really even stronger here, is that it is a
misdemeanor for someone to possess a gun, to store or leave a loaded firearm in any
location where an individual knew or should have known that an unsupervised minor child
would have access to it."
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drank. Yet common sense suggests that both the auto maker and the
brewery probably foresee that every year, and indeed quite often,
someone will drink to excess, get into a car and kill someone. And
while one might argue that an automobile has more social utility than
a gun, it is difficult to maintain the same argument with respect to the
alcoholic beverage. In the case of the drunk driver, however, the com-
munity condemns the driver for acting irresponsibly9 " and in the case
of the child shooting, the community decries the gun manufacturer
for not making a gun that would be more difficult to shoot.9'
Perhaps the difference in the reaction lies in our view that cars
are essential to our way of life and in our knee-jerk chafing at anything
that would restrict our unlimited access to the automobile. Perhaps
the difference in the reaction lies in our mounting fear of an increas-
ingly gun-toting America and escalating gun crime statistics. Perhaps
we believe that a person who is incarcerated for drunk driving will not
repeat the offense, but we do not believe that the criminal justice sys-
tem will work as well for the shooter. Whatever the reason for the
difference in our reaction, from the perspective of product liability
law the two scenarios are not so different as to require different
analyses.
III. THE SECOND AMENDMENT
One final issue unique to guns must be addressed in order to
understand fully why the law struggles with liability for their manufac-
ture. Like the rhinoceros in the living room that everyone sees and
no one talks about, the Second Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution affects the way we view guns in America. The Second
Amendment provides: "[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."9 2
Whether the Second Amendment confers rights upon individuals
to keep and bear arms, or only protects against government interfer-
90. "He had been caught driving drunk six times since 1984, and yet he continued to
drink excessively and get behind the wheel. It's that kind of irresponsible behavior that is
addressed in the pending highway bill." John Lawn & Marion Blakey, Getting Hard-Core
Drunk Drivers Off the Road, THE WASH. POST, May 20, 1998, at A25; "This is another irre-
sponsible drunk driver with no sane explanation." Art Barnum, Woman is Given 18 Months
in Fatal Drunk-Driving Crash, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 2000, Tribune West, at 2.
91. "Gun manufacturers are not taking the responsibility to ensure their products are
safe." Jim Frost, Warning Shots, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997 (Editorial), at 39; "Gun man-
ufacturers could be required to put safety locks on guns." Alan Bavley & Mary Sanchez,
Treat Firearm Violence Like a Disease, Experts Say, THE KAN. CITY STAR, May 22, 1998, at Al.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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ence with a popular ability to mount a militia, is a matter of heated
debate that persists today:
Two main schools of thought have developed on the issue of
whether the Second Amendment recognizes individual or
collective rights. These schools of thought are referred to as
the "states' rights," or "collective rights," school and the "in-
dividual rights" school. The former group cites the opening
phrase of the amendment, along with subsequent case law, as
authority for the idea that the right only allows states to es-
tablish and maintain militias, and in no way creates or pro-
tects an individual right to own arms.. .. Due to changes in
the political climate over the last two centuries and the rise
of National Guard organizations among the states, states'
rights theorists argue that the Second Amendment is an
anachronism, and that there is no longer a need to protect
any right to private gun ownership.
The individual rights theorists, supporting what has be-
come known in the academic literature as the "Standard
Model," argue that the amendment protects an individual
right inherent in the concept of ordered liberty, and resist
any attempt to circumscribe that right. .... 93
Surprisingly, few products actions involving harms caused by guns
have based defenses upon the Second Amendment.94 Rarely has a
court squarely confronted a constitutional claim in a gun products
case. Two notable opinions, one emanating from a products liability
case involving guns and the other from a criminal case challenging a
statute regarding possession of a firearm, report diametrically-op-
93. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (citations omit-
ted). It is beyond the scope of this Note to resolve this constitutional question. The litera-
ture is rich with debate, some scholarly and some overheated, as to the scope of the right
conferred by the Second Amendment. See, e.g., David E. Johnson, Taking a Second Look at
the Second Amendment and Modem Gun Control Laws, 86 Ky. L.J. 197 (1998); Sanford Levin-
son, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); Andrew D. Herz, Gun
Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV.
57 (1995); Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996); Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A
Right to Self-Defense Against Criminals and Despots, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 25 (Winter, 1997).
94. Defenses to gun products liability claims which are not based on the Second
Amendment include: Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6) in McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 151
(2d Cir. 1997); the doctrine of collateral estoppel in Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d
1236, 1237-38 (Alaska 1983); and failure to state a cause of action in Forni v. Ferguson,
232 A.D.2d 176, 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
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posed results on the interpretation of the Second Amendment's
"right" to bear arms.
95
In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,9 6 judge Weinstein addressed whether the
Second Amendment could limit the plaintiffs' claims under state tort
law regarding the defendant gun manufacturers' marketing prac-
tices.9 7 Flatly denouncing the "individual rights" view of the Second
Amendment, the court held:
The [Second] Amendment limits congressional power over
the colonial analogues of our National Guard. It does not
guarantee the right to kill. Nor does it inhibit state tort law.
It does not protect the manufacturers of guns against the
plaintiffs' charge that they must take whatever reasonable
precautions are required by state tort law to prevent or limit
the operation of an illegal handgun market that supplies
criminals.
In addition, the Court's jurisprudence teaches that the
Amendment establishes a collective right, rather than an in-
dividual or private right . . . . [T]he Second Amendment
right "applies only to the right of the State to maintain a mili-
tia and not to the individual's right to bear arms, there can
be no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an
individual to possess a firearm."9 8
The remarkable opinion in U.S. v. Emerson9 9 is noted here to illus-
trate America's tortured relationship with the gun and to highlight
how we as a culture struggle with countervailing societal currents
when the issue of guns is confronted. In Emerson, the defendant had
been subject to a temporary restraining order (TRO) emanating from
a divorce proceeding.' 0 Under that TRO, the defendant was en-
joined from making various financial transactions detrimental to the
family unit while the divorce proceedings were pending and from
making threatening communications to, or physical attacks upon, his
wife while the divorce was pending. 10 1
A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (8), made it a felony for a
person under a court order that included a finding that he repre-
sented a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner to
95. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1317-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); United
States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600-10 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
96. 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
97. See id. at 1317.
98. Id. at 1317-18 (citations omitted).
99. 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
100. See id. at 598-99.
101. See id. at 599.
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possess a firearm.' The defendant in Emerson argued that the fed-
eral statute violated, inter alia, his Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms.'0 3 After an exhaustive analysis of the Second Amend-
ment, including its text, the history of gun ownership in England, the
history of gun ownership in colonial America, the constitutional ratifi-
cation debates, the process of drafting the Second Amendment, the
structure of the Amendment, and judicial decisions interpreting the
Amendment, the court concluded that the federal statute violated the
Second Amendment's individual right to keep and bear arms. 10 4 The
court held:
It is absurd that a boilerplate state court divorce order can
collaterally and automatically extinguish a law-abiding citi-
zen's Second Amendment rights, particularly when neither
the judge issuing the order, nor the parties nor their attor-
neys are aware of the federal criminal penalties arising from
firearm possession after entry of the restraining order. That
such a routine civil order has such extensive consequences
totally attenuated from divorce proceedings makes the stat-
ute unconstitutional. There must be a limit to government
regulation on lawful firearm possession. This statute exceeds
that limit, and therefore it is unconstitutional. °5
Beginning with the proposition that "there is a long tradition of wide-
spread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country, "106
the court in Emerson concluded, "[a] historical examination of the
right to bear arms, from English antecedents to the drafting of the
102. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (8) provides, in pertinent part:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person -
(8) who is subject to a court order that -
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual no-
tice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an in-
timate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or per-
son, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner
in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(C) (i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat
to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would
reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury ....
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1999).
103. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 598, 600 (N.D. Texas 1999).
104. See Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 600-11.
105. Id. at 611.
106. Id. at 601 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994)).
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Second Amendment, bears proof that the right to bear arms has con-
sistently been, and should still be, construed as an individual right."1"7
Whether one subscribes to the view that the Second Amendment
confers an individual or a collective right (and there appears in the
literature no clear-cut answer to that question),° 8 the Second Amend-
ment throws a theoretical monkey wrench into the way in which we
think about guns in our society. Constitutional arguments turn up the
heat under the debate insofar as the debate about guns focuses on
statutory or administrative efforts to curb gun ownership, possession,
or control. The word "gun" causes legal theorists to duck and scram-
ble for cover as effectively as it does when shouted on a crowded sub-
way car. In short, we struggle with gun liability theory because our
existing principles of consumer expectation and obviousness of dan-
ger do not seem to work justly when applied to guns and because we
feel collectively powerless to protect ourselves against the harms that
guns unquestionably cause.
CONCLUSION
When the emotional rhetoric is stripped away from the debate
over guns in society, and solid legal analysis examines the question of
whether products liability law provides a remedy for those injured by
guns, it is clear that "carelessness and misuse cannot transform an ob-
viously-and inherently-dangerous product into a defective, and
'unreasonably dangerous' product."1 °9 Professor Owen has suggested
as a fundamental principle of liability the rule that "[u]sers should be
responsible for foreseeable harm caused by product uses that they
should know to be unreasonably dangerous."1 1 The rationale is
rooted in the moral and ethical theory underpinning all of product
liability law:
The final principles of justice and liability concern the con-
sumer's responsibility for using products safely. The stan-
dard of responsibility is cast in objective terms of balance,
requiring consumers to bear responsibility for harm that re-
sults from uses that fall below a norm that fairly may be ex-
107. Id. at 602 (emphasis added). One can find support for both sides of the issue;
sometimes the support emanates from unexpected quarters. Staunch libertarian Justice
William 0. Douglas wrote: "A powerful lobby dins into the ears of our citizenry that these
gun purchases are constitutional rights protected by the Second Amendment .... Our
decisions belie that argument, for the Second Amendment, as noted, was designed to keep
alive the militia." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
108. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
109. Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 380 (D. Mass. 1996).
110. Moral Foundations, supra note 59, at 502.
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pected of ordinary persons. At first glance, it may appear
odd and perhaps regressive to propose a principle that re-
sembles contributory negligence in a modern products liabil-
ity system based on moral principles. But most consumers
are generally capable of acting reasonably, and so their fail-
ure to conform their conduct to normal, proper standards
ordinarily reflects a moral failure of responsibility. To hold
otherwise would derogate the dignity of consumers as auton-
omous beings who are morally accountable for the harmful
consequences of their chosen actions that they should know
to be unsafe. Consumers cannot fairly demand to be re-
lieved of the harmful consequences of mistakes attributable
to their moral failures, nor to have such harm imposed in-
stead upon other persons free of moral blame.'
The noble intentions of advocates for gun control laws, the pain
of loss for survivors of gunshot accidents, and the frustration of health
care professionals who must clean up after the shooters, all are trage-
dies that we as a society must address. Civil actions against the makers
of a product that performs exactly as expected and as intended, how-
ever, do not provide a satisfactory forum to redress those grievances:
The increasing number of cases like this one . . .are in-
tended to . .. accomplish gun control under the guise of
products liability law-by trying to subject handgun manu-
facturers to liability for all injuries caused by their products.
Presumably, the proponents of these suits feel that 'Judges
and juries enjoy immunity from the political pressures of the
gun control lobby," and that handgun control "is not going
to come legislatively any time soon, if ever."
But the unconventional theories advanced in this case (and
others) are totally without merit, a misuse of products liabil-
ity laws. It makes no sense to characterize any product as
"defective"-even a handgun-if it performs as intended
and causes injury only because it is intentionally misused
Moreover, the judicial system is, at best, ill-equipped to deal
with the emotional issues of handgun control. Certainly,
there can be no effective handgun control imposed on an ad
hoc basis by six or twelve jurors sitting in judgment on a sin-
gle case. Decisions in these suits-made on the basis of a
particular record developing a unique set of facts-will nec-
essarily be inconsistent, and there can only be varying and
uneven results in different jurisdictions .... Thus, an over-
111. Id. at 505.
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whelming number of cases-and tremendous expenditure of
judicial resources-would be required before the propo-
nents of these unconventional theories could even begin to
accomplish their ultimate goal: driving all handgun manu-
facturers out of business ....
.... [A]s a judge, I know full well that the question of
whether handguns can be sold is a political one, not an issue
of products liability law-and that this is a matter for the leg-
islatures, not the courts."1 2
112. Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1215-16 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (boldface
original) (citations omitted). See also, Wasylow, 975 F. Supp. at 380-81 ("It is the province of
legislative or authorized administrative bodies, and not the judicial branch, to advance
through democratic channels policies that would directly or indirectly either 1) ban some
classes of handguns or 2) transform firearm enterprises into insurers against misuse of
their products. Frustration at the failure of legislatures to enact laws sufficient to curb
handgun injuries is not adequate reason to engage the judicial forum in efforts to imple-
ment a broad policy change.").
